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On 11 December 2019, Advocate General Pikamäe issued his Opinion rejecting
jurisdiction of the ECJ in an infringement procedure between Slovenia and Croatia
(C-457/18). The case raises the question whether the ECJ may engage with
asserted violations of EU law which result from Croatia’s non-recognition of the final
and binding Arbitral Award determining the border dispute between both Members.
The opinion of the Advocate General appears to be fuelled by political rather than
legal considerations and the ECJ should not follow it in order to make clear that
the EU is able to protect its autonomous legal system and that it stands on its
foundational and common legal principles.   
Borders Divide – Undetermined Borders Divide Even
More
In former socialist Yugoslavia all its people had been united under the motto of
“brotherhood and unity” and any attempt to exactly define the borders among
the federal national units was repeatedly being regarded as undermining its
very idea. The collapse of Yugoslavia consequently unveiled several unresolved
national border issues, amongst others between Slovenia and Croatia. Since their
independence in 1991, both states have unsuccessfully tried to resolve this arduous
political burden. Upon the Croatian negotiation process to join the EU, however,
the EU demanded that Croatia shall settle the border dispute as a condition for
accession. Finally, both states signed an Arbitration Agreement which would
ultimately determine the border by international arbitration. The EU was monitoring
that process and co-signed the Arbitration Agreement as a witness. Moreover,
the Accession Treaty between the EU and Croatia, which is EU law, expressly
refers to the Arbitration Agreement and the anticipated Arbitral Award with regard to
(secondary) EU law (namely the territorial waters and the common fisheries policy).
The Arbitral Award therefore at least indirectly entered the EU legal system.
When the Arbitral Award was issued in 2017, final and binding according to rules of
public international law, Croatia refused to accept it. This was due not least to the
fact that an arbiter appointed by Slovenia had been recorded talking to a Slovenian
government agent about the arbitral proceedings, which is a procedural violation and
which put the fairness of the proceedings into question. Both Slovenian and Croatian
arbiters resigned and Croatia one-sidedly decided that the arbitral proceedings were
irrevocably finished. Legally, however, it is not possible to terminate or withdraw
from ongoing arbitration proceedings. In line with the applicable procedural rules,
new arbiters were appointed and held in an intermediary decision (Partial Award)
that the cited procedural violation cannot be the reason for Croatia to permanently
- 1 -
dismiss the arbitral proceedings. They stated that the new composition of the arbitral
tribunal was competent to issue an impartial award determining the border between
Slovenia and Croatia. Consequently, they delivered the final and binding Arbitral
Award determining the border dispute. Yet, Croatia to this day refuses to accept and
to implement the Award.
Slovenia started an infringement procedure pursuant to Article 259 TFEU against
Croatia claiming that EU law is being violated due to Croatia’s refusal to comply with
and implement the final and binding Arbitral Award. Slovenia argued that it cannot
carry out regulations relating to common fisheries policy, maritime special planning
and border control according to the Schengen regulations. Moreover, Slovenia
also asserted that Croatia violates the rule of law principle while not respecting the
res iudicata decision and the principle of sincere cooperation pursuant to Croatia’s
prior commitment to finally resolve and settle the border dispute by international
arbitration as agreed upon and articulated in the Arbitration Agreement and in the
Accession Treaty (pacta sunt servanda).  
Misleadingly Framing the Issue
Pursuant to Article 259 TFEU, the ECJ has jurisdiction when a Member State
considers that another Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the
Treaties. Yet, the violation of EU law here is intrinsically connected with the
compliance of the Member State with public international law, specifically with the
res iudicata Arbitral Award.
The Advocate General framed the issue as the question whether the ECJ has the
competence to interpret public international law, namely the Arbitral Award. He
argues that the Arbitral Award does not fall within the scope of EU law application
and is therefore not directly binding on the EU. Hence, the ECJ does not have
the jurisdiction to determine violations of EU law being ancillary to an ongoing
legal dispute in public international law, which still needs to be determined by the
competent authority and does not fall within the scope of EU law application.
This framing is misleading for two reasons. First, jurisdiction of the ECJ in this
case is not connected to the question of whether the EU has competences in
public international law concerning a border dispute and the Arbitral Award but
whether EU primary and secondary law are being violated. In particular, the EU
law obligations in question are to respect res iudicata, the rule of law principle, the
principle of sincere cooperation and regulations relating to common fisheries policy,
maritime special planning and border control due to the Schengen regulations.
Second, those ancillary violations could only be excluded from the jurisdiction of
the ECJ (as the Advocate General argues while referring to the Case C-132/09
European Commission v Kingdom of Belgium), if there is a pending dispute in public
international law which would still need a judicial interpretation by the competent
authority. But a final and binding res iudicata Arbitral Award is not an open dispute
in public international law but a legal fact which Member States and the EU have to
respect.
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Accordingly, the ECJ arguably has jurisdiction to determine potential violations of EU
law even if they are ancillary to public international law, when the public international
law is res iudicata, fully determined and directly binding on a Member State. The
ECJ would in that situation exercise no interpretive power which could collide with
rules and procedures of public international law and its institutions. 
Relationship Between the Arbitral Award and the EU
The Advocate General stated that the Arbitral Award does not directly bind the EU
and therefore the ECJ does not have jurisdiction in the case at hand. However, even
if the Arbitral Award does not directly bind the EU as such, it is still partially a matter
of EU law.
Notwithstanding and in addition to the section above, the Arbitral Award cannot
be seen as disconnected from EU law. First, the EU substantially negotiated and
even co-drafted the Arbitration Agreement (the Commission and the Swedish
Presidency of the Council of the EU played a very active role). Moreover, the EU
also co-signed the Arbitration Agreement as a witness. Although not being one
of the parties, that puts the EU in a special sui generis position as being formally
involved in the proceedings. In addition, the Arbitration Agreement even invites
the European Commission to provide secretarial support to the Arbitral Tribunal.
Finally, the determination of borders by international arbitration has found its way
into the EU system, namely into the Accession Treaty between Croatia and the EU
by articulating the legal and factual consequences in relation to the anticipated final
and binding Arbitral Award.
The subject matter is therefore uniquely related with the EU. The Arbitral Award does
not directly bind the EU, but it is also not outside of the scope of the EU treaties. The
argumentation of the Advocate General regarding the exclusive territorial sovereignty
of national states to determine their borders which is a priori fully disconnected with
the EU is therefore in this particular case unpersuasive.    
Interpreting the Arbitral Award – Determination v
Implementation
Perhaps the most unconvincing argument of Advocate General Pikamäe relates to
his interpretation of the Arbitral Award, claiming that it is not final and binding under
public international law since one party denies its effect and refuses to implement
it. However, the rejection of the validity of the Award is solely political since Croatia
has not initiated any legal proceedings e.g. before the ICJ trying to annul the Award,
which might be a potential legal way to challenge the proceedings.
Curiously, the Advocate General builds his line of reasoning on the feature of public
international law not having a binding mechanism to execute international arbitral
awards independent from sovereign states. Consequently, it is not unknown in
public international law that one party disregards an international arbitral award
and refuses to implement it, claims the Advocate General, while (oddly) referring to
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the practices of the People’s Republic of China. He concludes that the res iudicata
Arbitral Award cannot be final and binding if one party (in the case at hand solely
politically) disputes it.
In order to justify this conclusion, Pikamäe introduces his own distinction between
determining and establishing the Arbitral Award. Only if the Arbitral Award was
to be implemented it would in his opinion become established and therefore
final and binding. Only then, the ECJ could potentially take it into consideration.
Pikamäe therefore clearly interprets public international law in his capacity as
the EU Advocate General, thus doing precisely what he argues the ECJ should
not do. Moreover, even if he had the competence to interpret the Arbitral Award
in that sense, his argumentation proves to be circular. The Arbitral Award would
firstly have to be implemented, he claims, and only then could the EU take it into
account. But the violation of EU law obviously only arises because the Arbitral Award
is not implemented – otherwise there would be no EU law violation. So it seems
that the artificial distinction between determination and establishment only serves
to disregard the final and binding (judicial) decision because one party politically
objects to it. Or in other words, according to Pikamäe, the Arbitral Award could only
be valid and binding, if both parties were to voluntarily respect it. That is a deeply
problematic understanding of public international law.
Taking the European Rule of Law Seriously
Finally, there is the rule of law principle and the principle of sincere cooperation.
Slovenia claims that disregarding the commitments to finally settle the dispute by
arbitration, which were given while Croatia had negotiated its accession to the EU,
violates these principles. Slovenia lifted its reservations to Croatia´s accession to the
EU precisely because it legally relied on the border dispute being finally resolved.
The Advocate General rejected this claim stating that these guarantees arguably
cannot be seen as legal obligations connected to EU law pursuant to the Accession
Treaty but purely as political conditions.
Moreover, pursuant to Article 259 TFEU a Member State cannot initiate an
infringement procedure before first bringing the matter before the European
Commission which shall deliver a reasoned opinion after both states submit
their observations. Only if the Commission does not deliver an opinion within
three months can the matter be brought before the ECJ. In the case at hand,
the Commission received a legal opinion (disclosed in the Spiegel) by its legal
department affirming the asserted violations of EU law. Yet, the Commission officially
remained silent and the Advocate General suggested to exclude the legal opinion
from the file.
Hence, the political arguably plays a considerable role in the dispute at hand.
Especially for small Member States that do not have strong political influence in
the Union this cannot be good news. The rule of law should be the essence of the
EU project and the EU institutions should demonstrate non-biased commitment to
protect it equally among all Member States. How else could one revert the rule of law
backsliding in other Member States – often claiming that the rule of law argument
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only serves as a political tool to put in line their political decisions – if it is not taken
seriously every time?
The ECJ should acknowledge the EU’s major role in negotiating, drafting and co-
signing the Arbitral Agreement. Moreover, it should regard the inclusion of the
anticipated Arbitral Award in the Accession Treaty and therefore in the EU treaties
as a legal, not political matter. Lastly, it should see the Arbitral Award as a final and
binding res iudicata decision which does not need to be interpreted as a pending
matter of public international law but simply observed as a legal fact. Consequently,
the ECJ should accept its legal responsibility and exercise its jurisdiction, regardless
of the political sensibility of the subject matter.
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